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TWO AUTOMOBILES INSURED UNDER FAMILY POLICY
DOUBLES STATED MEDICAL PAYMENTS COVERAGE
LIMIT OF LIABILITY
Central Surety & Insurance Corp. v. Elder
204 Va. 192,129 S.E. 2d 651 (1963)
Mrs. Elder, plaintiff below, sued to recover $1,781.24 alleged to be
due her as an insured under the medical payments coverage of an auto-
mobile policy issued by defendant company to her husband. Plaintiff was
injured and incurred medical bills in this amount while riding as a passen-
ger in an uninsured vehicle owned and operated by another person. The
policy involved in this litigation was of the type referred to in the industry
as the standard family combination automobile policy.' The declarations
section of the policy listed two automobiles owned by plaintiff's husband
and showed a medical payments coverage limit of liability as $1,000 per
1 The relevant provisions of the policy are reproduced here in their entirety since
they are essentially the exact provisions of policies used in Ohio and the cases discussed
infra.
DECLARATIONS
Item 3. The insurance afforded is only with respect to such and so many
of the following coverages as are indicated by specific premium charge or
charges. The limit of the Company's liability against each such coverage shall
be as stated herein, subject to all the terms of this policy having reference
thereto.
COVERAGES LIMITS OF LIABILITY PREMIUMS
A. Bodily Injury Liability Car 1 Car 2
CLASS 1B $25,000.00 each person
CLASS 1B $50,000.00 each occurrence .............. $29.92 $22.44
B. Property Damage
Liability $5,000.00 each occurrence .................. $17.00 $12.75
C. Medical Payments
$1,000.00 each person .............................. $ 9.00 $ 5.25
PART II-EXPENSE FOR MEDICAL SERVICES
Coverage C-Medical Payments: To pay all reasonable expenses incurred
within one year from the date of accident for necessary medical . . . services:
Division 1. To or for the named Insured and each relative who sustains
bodily injury ... caused by accident, while occupying or through being struck
by an automobile;
Limit of Liability: The limit of liability for medical payments stated in
the declarations as applicable to "each person" is the limit of the Company's
liability for all expenses incurred by or on behalf of each person who sustains
bodily injury as the result of any one accident.
CONDITIONS
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
person, per accident. Plaintiff contended that because of the condition
in the policy concerning two or more automobiles, defendant was liable
for $1,000 per person, per accident, per car listed in the declarations. De-
fendant maintained the extent of its liability was $1,000 per person per
accident regardless of the number of cars insured under the policy. Plain-
tiff prevailed below and the insurer appealed to the Virginia Supreme
Court, which affirmed the judgment of the lower court.2
In the instant case it was conceded that if plaintiff had two separate
policies she could collect under both and thus recover the full amount of
her expenses. 3  Plaintiff contended that the effect of Condition 4, which
states that the terms of the policy apply separately to each automobile
insured, was to create separate policies for each of the insured automobiles,
thus the company's maximum liability for medical payments was $2,000.
Plaintiff also pointed out that a premium was paid for medical payments
on each automobile and argued that without "additional coverage" on the
second car there would be no consideration for the premium paid. De-
fendant asserted that these provisions of the policy were not ambiguous
since the words "each person" have a definite and clear meaning and when
read in connection with the Limit of Liability provisions of the policy it is
clear that the company's liability is limited to $1,000 for each person in-
jured in each accident regardless of the number of automobiles insured
under the policy. The company claimed Condition 4 "merely means that
when two or more automobiles are insured, the terms of the policy, with
all the benefits and limitations, shall apply to each automobile." 4
In its decision the Virginia court quoted extensively from the opinions
in Sullivan v. Royal Exch. Assur.,5 Southwestern Fire & Cas. Co. v. At-
kins,6 and Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Epperson.7 Substan-
tially the identical question was presented in these cases as in the instant
case. The court in Sullivan found for the insurer, while in Atkins and
Epperson the policyholder prevailed. The Virginia court, noting this con-
flict in holdings by other courts and the fact that prior to suit defendant's
field claim superintendent had by letter indicated that he agreed with plain-
tiff's interpretation of the coverage,8 found that the policy provisions were
4. Two or More Automobiles: Part I, II and III When two or more
automobiles are insured hereunder, the terms of this policy shall apply separately
to each.
2 Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Elder, 204 Va. 192, 129 S.E.2d 651 (1963).
3 129 S.E.2d at 653.
4 Ibid.
G 181 Cal. App. 2d 644, 5 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1960).
6 346 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
7 234 Ark. 1100, 356 S.W.2d 613 (1962).
8 The letter stated in part, "[W]e insure two automobiles for Mr. Elder. There
is medical payments coverage on each of these vehicles with a limit of $1,000. . ..
[A]s I interpret the coverage, there is in effect medical payments coverage . . . up to
a limit of $2,000." Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Elder, supra note 2, 129 S.E.2d at 653.
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ambiguous and susceptible of two conflicting constructions. Having found
this ambiguity and conflict the court applied the well established rule that
wherever such an ambiguity is found the contract is to be interpreted
liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer.9
An examination of the reasoning of the other courts which have faced
this question indicates where the ambiguities and conflicts within the policy
may be found. The Sullivan case was decided first in point of time and
stands alone in its result favoring the insurer on this precise question in-
volving the limit of the medical payments coverage. There were insig-
nificant variations in the facts.'0 Defendant insurer maintained that the
Limit of Liability clause under Part II was a particular limitation which,
by reason of the California Code," should prevail over the general Con-
dition 4 upon which the plaintiff's case rested. The California court had no
precedents by which to be guided, therefore it decided the case by analogy
to cases where third party bodily injury claimants were limited to the
stated amount of liability per person and not per accident as contended.1
The only analogy which can be drawn from these cases, however is that
plaintiffs were injured and defendants were insurance companies. The
question in Sullivan concerned the interpretation of provisions not in issue
in those cases the court considered to be analogous. On the basis of the
questionable analogy and the code requirement of construction this court
found for the insurer.
A Texas court was presented with the identical question in the Atkins
case almost a year later. The same general contentions as in the principal
case were made by the parties with the insurer submitting the additional
argument that the manual on file with the state board of insurance specific-
ally stated that the inclusion of more than one automobile under the policy
does not operate to increase the company's medical payment limit of li-
9 See, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Fratarcangelo, 201 Va. 672, 677, 112 S.E2d
892, 895 (1960); Copelin-Mohn v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 135 Ohio St. 287, 290,
20 N.E.2d 713, 714 (1939). See generally 44 C.J.S. Insurance §297 (c) (1946).
10 The insured was injured while a pedestrian and the limit stated in the declara-
tions was $2,000.
11 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1859 provides:
... [I]n the construction of the instrument the intention of the parties is to be
pursued if possible; and when a general and particular provision are inconsistent,
the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular intent will control a gen-
eral one that is inconsistent with it.
12 An example of this type of case is Lowery v. Zorn, 184 La. 1054, 168 So. 297
(1936). The declarations in the policy limited the company's liability for bodily in-
jury to $5,000 to one person and $10,000 for any one accident. The insurer was held
liable for only $5,000 to a party suffering damages in excess of that amount not-
withstanding that the total damage suffered by both injured parties in the accident
was less than $10,000. A similar Ohio case is Reinhart v. Great American Mut.
Indemn., 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 331 (C.P. 1924).
Nor does the per accident limitation create a fund to be prorated between in-
jured claimants. Each claimant is limited to recovery of only the per person limit.
Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Winget, 197 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952).
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ability. The latter argument was summarily dismissed by the court on
the basis that the manual forms no part of the insured's contract, therefore
it is not binding upon him. The court then reasoned that because a pre-
mium is charged upon each car individually and Condition 4 states that
the terms of the policy apply separately to each, there are in effect two
separate contracts of insurance contained in the one policy. Had there
been separate policies on each car there is no doubt that the insured could
collect under both subject only to the pro rata provisions of each policy.' 3
Since there are two separate contracts in the one policy, the policyholder
is entitled to collect under both of them. The court pointed out that to
follow the company's construction would deprive the insured of any benefit
from the payment of the additional premium since he could have collected
the same amount by payment of the premium on only one automobile.' 4
The court then applied the rule favoring insureds in cases where ambiguities
are present and found for the policyholder. The same line of reasoning
was used by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Epperson 5 when it specific-
ally rejected the holding in Sullivan and found for the policyholder. The
separate premium, therefore separate contract, therefore additional bene-
fit contention, which was not made in Sullivan, is apparently the determina-
tive argument for the policyholder.' 6
The sparseness of litigation and comment on the narrow question
involved in these cases is due to a combination of factors. The combina-
tion family automobile policy has only been in use since the mid-1950's. 7
This policy was an abrupt departure from its predecessor and was intended
to broaden and liberalize coverages for the insured.'8 For this reason,
decisions interpreting the old forms are of slight value when the question
concerns a provision such as Condition 4, which was not present in the
old forms. Secondly, the large number of two-car families is a rather
13 Southwestern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Atkins, supra note 6, at 894; Kansas City
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Epperson, supra note 7, at 1102, 356 S.W.2d at 614; Central
Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Elder, supra note 2, 129 S.E.2d at 653.
14 Southwestern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Atkins, supra note 6, at 894.
1r Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Epperson, supra note 7.
16 In Southwestern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Atkins, supra note 6 at 894 the court en-
dorses the argument in these words:
[T]he policy is in effect two policies of insurance in one. This view is supported
by the fact that separate premiums are charged for each car; the medical pay-
ment premium being $8 on Car 1 and $7 on Car 2.. . . [I]f he [the policyholder]
can collect only $500, he is no better off for having taken out medical payments on
both cars than on one car, since he could recover the same amount had he taken
out medical payments on only the one car.
Similarly, in Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Epperson, supra note 7 at
1102, 356 S.W.2d at 614, the court states it would be "reasonable to think that the
additional premium charged for the inclusion of a second car was intended to afford
some corresponding added benefit to the insured."
17 Elliott, "The Family Automobile Policy," 37 Neb. L. Rev. 581 (1955).
Is Breen, "The New Automobile Policy," 1955 Ins. LJ. 328.
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recent phenomenon in our society.19 Therefore, with the exception of fleet
policies which are written on a different form, there has been little ex-
perience where two private passenger automobiles are covered under the
same policy. Finally, these controversies arise between the company and
its policyholder. In all probability the adjuster, upon his first contact
with the insured, states that the limit of liability is that shown in the
declarations and ends the matter. If there is an "educated" policyholder
or lawyer involved, and the ambiguity is pointed out, there is a propensity
on the part of most companies to effectuate compromises and dispose of
policyholder disputes amicably without litigation. Since accidents show
no signs of decreasing and two-car families should increase, this question
should come before the courts more frequently.
An interesting ramification could result if the courts were to find this
same ambiguity in the bodily injury and property damage liability sections
of the policy. While the Limit of Liability rarely exceeds $5,000 under the
medical payments coverage, the Ohio Financial Responsibility Law re-
quires a minimum bodily injury Limit of Liability in the amount of $10,000
per person and $20,000 per accident.20 Bodily injury limits in excess of this
statutory minimum are not uncommon. Two or more times the medical
payments limit pales into insignificance when compared with multiplication
of the bodily injury limits. The provision limiting the amount of liability
coverage in the Ohio policy is couched in the same terms of each person
each occurrence (accident) as is the medical payments Limit of Liability
clause.2 1 Condition 4 is applicable to the entire policy, therefore the same
result could ensue if an ambiguity were declared to exist.
An attempt at making this extension is found in Pacific Indent. Co. v.
Thompson,2 2 where plaintiff insurance company sought a declaratory judg-
ment naming as defendants its insured and the third party bodily injury
claimant. Defendant insured had three automobiles listed in one policy
and while driving one of these named automobiles he was involved in an
accident causing damage in excess of the bodily injury limit as stated in the
declarations of his policy. Defendant third party claimant contended that
19 Apparently the presence of multiple-car families was insignificant enough to be
overlooked by the Census Bureau in 1950. The 1960 figures show that almost one in
three occupied housing units which have automobiles have two or more. United States
Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book 1962, p. 6, items 71 and 72.
20 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4509.51 (Page 1960).
21 "Part I-Liability . . .
Limits of Liability: The limit of bodily injury liability stated in the declarations
as applicable to 'each person' is the limit of the company's liability for all damages
... arising out of bodily injury sustained by one person as the result of any one
occurrence; the limit of such liability stated in the declaration as applicable to
'each occurrence' is . . . the total limit of the company's liability for all such dam-
ages arising out of bodily injury sustained by two or more persons as the result
of any one occurrence. The limit of property damage liability stated in the declara-
tions as applicable to 'each occurrence' is the total limit of the company's liability
... to ...one or more persons ... as the result of any one occurrence."
22 56 Wash. 2d 715, 355 P.2d 12 (1960).
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Condition 4 of the policy gave defendant insured three times the amount of
coverage stated in the declarations. The court held for plaintiff com-
pany stating that the Limit of Liability clause under the bodily injury sec-
tion was controlling and not qualified by any other policy provision. The
court said that Condition 4 "merely assured the applicability of the policy
to whichever car is involved in an accident, or to all the cars, and does no
more."23 It should be noted that this case was decided before any of the
medical payments cases declared an ambiguity to exist and the argument
of separate premiums, therefore separate contracts, therefore additional
benefits, was not made by the policyholder.
In view of the above holdings there is no doubt that an ambiguity or
conflict exists between those paragraphs in the policy which attempt to
limit the liability of the company and that condition which purports to make
the terms of the policy apply to each automobile insured thereunder. As-
suming that the basic intention of the companies is to limit recovery to
the amounts stated in the declarations, it is incumbent upon them to elim-
inate the ambiguous language. This could be accomplished by insertion
into both the Limit of Liability paragraphs and Condition 4 wording
similar to that already in use in the severability of interest clause.24 Any
existing ambiguity could be dispelled by the addition of the words "the
inclusion herein of more than one automobile shall not operate to increase
the amount of the company's liability stated in the declarations." This
change in wording is imperative and, in addition, since the courts rely
heavily upon the separate premium charged for each automobile, the com-
panies should show on the face of the policy only the total amount of prem-
ium per coverage and not break it down per coverage per automobile. The
necessary computations can be made elsewhere than on the face of the
policy. The companies know of these adverse rulings and can at any time
proceed with the unilateral action necessary to reduce or confine their
liability. If, in the face of these decisions, the companies fail to act, the
courts can justly infer that the companies assent to the interpretations
which increase their liability.
23 Id. at 716, 355 P.2d at 12.
24 "Part I-Liability ...
Persons Insured: ...
The insurance afforded under Part I applies separately to each insured against
whom claim is made or suit is brought, but the inclusion herein of more than one
insured shall not operate to increase the limits of the company's liability."
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